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Much of the socioeconomic mobility achieved by U.S. immigrant families takes place across
rather than within generations. When assessing the long-term integration of immigrants, it is
therefore important to analyze differences not just between the foreign-born and U.S-born,
but also across generations of the U.S.-born. Because of data limitations, however, virtually
all studies of the later-generation descendants of immigrants rely on subjective measures of
ethnic self-identification rather than arguably more objective measures based on the
countries of birth of the respondent and his ancestors. In this context, biases can arise from
“ethnic attrition” (e.g., U.S.-born individuals who do not self-identify as Hispanic despite
having ancestors who were immigrants from a Spanish-speaking country). Analyzing 1994-
2010 data from the Current Population Survey (CPS), we present evidence that such ethnic
attrition is sizeable and selective for the second- and third-generation populations of key
Hispanic and Asian immigrant groups. In addition, our results suggest that ethnic attrition
generates measurement biases that vary across national origin groups in direction as well as
magnitude, and that correcting for these biases is likely to raise the socioeconomic standing
of the U.S.-born descendants of most Hispanic immigrants relative to their Asian
counterparts. Finally, although changes to the CPS Hispanic origin and race questions
adopted in 2003 have substantially lowered attrition rates for second- and third-generation
Hispanics and Asians, ethnic attrition remains a significant issue even with the improved
questionnaire.The Complexity of Immigrant Generations: Implications for Assessing the 
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  Much of the socioeconomic mobility achieved by U.S. immigrant families takes place 
across rather than within generations.  When assessing the long-term integration of immigrants, 
it is therefore important to analyze differences not just between the foreign-born and U.S-born, 
but also across generations of the U.S.-born.  Because of data limitations, however, virtually all 
studies of the later-generation descendants of immigrants rely on subjective measures of ethnic 
self-identification rather than arguably more objective measures based on the countries of birth 
of the respondent and his ancestors.  In this context, biases can arise from “ethnic attrition” (e.g., 
U.S.-born individuals who do not self-identify as Hispanic despite having ancestors who were 
immigrants from a Spanish-speaking country).  Analyzing 1994-2010 data from the Current 
Population Survey (CPS), we present evidence that such ethnic attrition is sizeable and selective 
for the second- and third-generation populations of key Hispanic and Asian immigrant groups.  
In addition, our results suggest that ethnic attrition generates measurement biases that vary across 
national origin groups in direction as well as magnitude, and that correcting for these biases is 
likely to raise the socioeconomic standing of the U.S.-born descendants of most Hispanic 
immigrants relative to their Asian counterparts.  Finally, although changes to the CPS Hispanic 
origin and race questions adopted in 2003 have substantially lowered attrition rates for second- 
and third-generation Hispanics and Asians, ethnic attrition remains a significant issue even with 
the improved questionnaire.  
I.  Introduction 
  Recent research highlights the complexity of immigrant generations in the United States.  
Varying ages at immigration, interethnic marriage, and marriage between co-ethnics of different 
generations create a wide variety of marital unions, and the particular configuration influences 
the ethnic attachments and socioeconomic attainment of the children produced by these 
marriages (Jensen 2001; Ramakrishnan 2004; Rumbaut 2004).  Within the first generation, for 
example, there are fundamental differences between immigrants who arrive as children (the so-
called “1.5 generation”) and those who arrive as adults, with much of the contrast attributable to 
advantages that child arrivals enjoy in learning English and from attending school in the United 
States (Oropesa and Landale 1997; Rumbaut 2004; Bleakley and Chin 2004, 2010).  Similarly, 
members of the second generation with one U.S.-born and one foreign-born parent have different 
experiences and often display favorable socioeconomic outcomes compared to their peers with 
two foreign-born parents, and the extent of these differences sometimes depends upon whether it 
is the second-generation member’s father or mother who is the U.S. native (Portes and Rumbaut 
2001; Ramakrishnan 2004; Rumbaut 2004). 
  Related research emphasizes how generational complexity shapes racial/ethnic 
attachment and identification, and how the resulting “attrition” can generate potentially serious 
problems for tracking the socioeconomic progress of later-generation descendants of U.S. 
immigrant groups (Perlmann and Waters 2007; Alba and Islam 2009; Lee and Bean 2010).  Our 
own previous work demonstrates the salience of these issues for the specific case of Mexican 
Americans (Duncan and Trejo 2007, 2009, 2011).  Analyzing microdata from the Current 
Population Survey (CPS) for children living with both parents, in Duncan and Trejo (2011) we 
compare an objective indicator of Mexican descent (based on the countries of birth of the child,   2 
his parents, and his grandparents) with the standard subjective measure of Mexican identification 
(based on the response to the Hispanic origin question).  Immigrant generations turn out to be 
quite complex, and this complexity is closely related to children’s subjective Mexican 
identification.  For example, only 17 percent of third-generation Mexican children have a 
majority of their grandparents born in Mexico.  Moreover, third-generation children are virtually 
certain of being identified as Mexican if three or four grandparents were born in Mexico, 
whereas rates of Mexican identification fall to 79 percent for children with two grandparents 
born in Mexico and 58 percent for children with just one Mexican-born grandparent.  Overall, 
about 30 percent of third-generation Mexican children are not identified as Mexican by the 
Hispanic origin question in the CPS, and this ethnic attrition is highly selective.  In particular, the 
high school dropout rate of third-generation Mexican youth (ages 16 and 17) is 25 percent higher 
when the sample is limited to those youth subjectively identified as Mexican.  Therefore, our 
previous research suggests that ethnic attrition is substantial among third-generation Mexicans 
and could produce significant downward bias in standard measures of attainment which rely on 
subjective ethnic identification rather than objective indicators of Mexican descent. 
  Measurement issues of this sort potentially loom large in assessments of immigrant 
assimilation.  Historically, much of the socioeconomic mobility achieved by U.S. immigrant 
families has taken place across rather than within generations (Neidert and Farley 1985; Borjas 
1994; Perlmann 2005).  When evaluating the long-term integration of immigrants, it is therefore 
important to analyze differences not just between the foreign-born and U.S-born, but also across 
generations of the U.S.-born (Farley and Alba 2002; Card 2005; Smith 2006).  The ideal data set 
for such an analysis would include information about the family tree of each individual, enabling 
us to identify which individuals have ancestors who immigrated to the United States from a   3 
particular country and how many generations have elapsed since that immigration took place.  
Information of this sort would also allow us to characterize the complexity of each individual’s 
immigrant roots in some detail, accounting for factors such as the specific national origins of an 
individual’s immigrant ancestors, whether the same national origins show up on both the paternal 
and maternal sides of the family tree, and how far removed from the current generation are the 
immigrant ancestors.  Unfortunately, the large, nationally-representative data sources typically 
employed to study U.S. immigrants and their descendants provide only very limited information 
pertaining to immigrant generations.  Microdata sources such as the decennial Census, the 
American Community Survey (ACS), and the CPS report each respondent’s country of birth, 
thereby distinguishing foreign-born individuals (i.e., the first generation) from the U.S.-born 
population.  Only the CPS, however, currently collects information about the countries of birth 
of each respondent’s parents, which allows the second generation (i.e., U.S.-born individuals 
who have at least one foreign-born parent) to be differentiated from higher generations of U.S.-
born individuals.  Moreover, none of these surveys provide information about the countries of 
birth of an adult respondent’s grandparents, so studies of immigrant descendants beyond the 
second generation are forced to identify the population of interest using subjective measures of 
ethnic identification (e.g., third- and higher-generation Mexicans are U.S.-born individuals who 
have U.S.-born parents and who self-identify as Mexican in response to the Hispanic origin 
question). 
  In this context, measurement biases arising from selective ethnic identification could 
distort assessments of the socioeconomic attainment and integration of later-generation 
descendants of immigrants.  The current paper explores this issue for a wide range of national 
origin groups from important Hispanic (Mexico, Puerto Rico, Cuba, El Salvador, and the   4 
Dominican Republic) and Asian (China, India, Japan, Korea, and the Philippines) source 
countries.  Using microdata from recent years of the CPS, we delineate the strong links between 
generational complexity and ethnic identification.  In addition, we analyze the extent and 
selectivity of ethnic attrition among first-, second-, and third-generation members of each of 
these immigrant groups, and we provide some evidence on the consequent biases in standard 
measures of attainment that almost always rely on subjective ethnic identification for immigrant 
descendants in the third generation and beyond. 
  Our paper contributes to existing research in several ways.  First, because of data 
limitations, previous work on the complexity of immigrant generations has focused on the first 
and second generations (Oropesa and Landale 1997; Ramakrishnan 2004; Rumbaut 2004).  We 
develop an empirical strategy that enables us to extend this type of analysis to the third 
generation, something we do not believe has been done before in a systematic fashion.  Second, 
recent research on ethnic attrition among immigrant descendants considers only a few national 
origin groups, primarily Cubans (Rumbaut 2004) and Mexicans (Alba and Islam 2009; Duncan 
and Trejo 2011).
1  We compare a number of key immigrant groups, including several Asian 
national origin groups.  These comparisons turn out to be interesting and important, as the extent 
of ethnic attrition varies widely across groups, and the educational selectivity of such attrition 
tends to run in the opposite direction for Hispanics and Asians.  In addition, our research 
                                                 
1 Closely related to this work, however, is the influential literature on ethnic attachment and identification among 
descendants of the European immigrants who arrived in the United States around the turn of the twentieth century.  After a few 
generations, so much intermarriage had taken place between these immigrant groups that most white Americans could choose 
among multiple ancestries or ethnic identities, creating measurement issues of the type that we consider here for Hispanic and 
Asian groups (Alba 1986, 1990; Waters 1990; Hout and Goldstein 1994).  In particular, Perlmann (2010) documents the 
complexity of ethnic origins for several generations of the descendants of German immigrants.  Also relevant is research 
demonstrating how selective identification can affect measures of socioeconomic attainment for non-immigrant groups such as 
American Indians.  Shifts in self-identification appear to account for much of the surprisingly large increase in educational 
attainment observed for American Indians between the 1970 and 1980 U.S. Censuses (Eschbach, Supple, and Snipp 1998).  In 
addition, Snipp (1989) shows that those who report American Indian as their race have considerably lower schooling and 
earnings, on average, than the much larger group of Americans who report a non-Indian race but claim to have some Indian 
ancestry.   5 
contributes to the broader literature that investigates the determinants of ethnic identification 
(Alba 1990; Waters 1990).  Until recently, analyses of ethnic responses in large U.S. surveys 
have focused mainly on whites of European descent (Alba and Chamlin 1983; Lieberson and 
Waters 1988, 1993; Farley 1991).  Our paper adds to the emerging literature that studies 
racial/ethnic identification among immigrant and minority groups (e.g., Hong and Min 1999; 
Waters 1999; Bailey 2001; Morning 2001; Landale and Oropesa 2002; Qian 2004; Itzigsohn, 
Giorguli, and Vazquez 2005; Brown, Hitlin, and Elder 2006; Perez 2008; Tovar and Feliciano 
2009; Lee and Bean 2010). 
  Labor economists have long been interested in tracking socioeconomic progress across 
immigrant generations (Chiswick 1977; Borjas 1992, 1994; Card, DiNardo, and Estes 2000; 
Trejo 2003; Smith 2006), and our study has potentially significant implications for this work.  
Finally, our paper also contributes to an emerging literature within economics that explicitly 
recognizes the complexity of ethnic identification and has begun to investigate the consequences 
of this complexity for labor market outcomes and policy.
2  In particular, economic models 
emphasize the potential endogeneity of identity and suggest mechanisms through which ethnic 
identification could be associated with both observed and unobserved characteristics of 
individuals.  To date, however, most empirical work in the relevant economics literature has 
focused on immigrants.  The analysis presented here demonstrates that some of the same issues 
can apply to native-born members of ethnic and minority groups.  In addition, we emphasize the 
complications that intergenerational shifts in ethnic identify can create for measuring the 
socioeconomic progress of later-generation descendants of immigrants. 
                                                 
2 Examples include Akerlof and Kranton (2000); Bisin and Verdier (2000); Bisin, Topa, and Verdier (2004); Mason 
(2004); Austen-Smith and Fryer (2005); Darity, Mason, and Stewart (2006); Constant and Zimmermann (2009); Manning and 
Roy (2010); and Bisin, Patacchini, Verdier, and Zenou (2011).  Zimmermann (2007) and Bisin and Verdier (2011) survey some 
of the relevant literature.   6 
  The paper is organized as follows.  The next section describes the data and our approach 
to defining immigrant generations and measuring ethnic attrition.  Section III presents an 
analysis of the extent and selectivity of ethnic attrition for first- and second-generation adults 
from the relevant Hispanic and Asian national origin groups, and Section IV provides a similar 
analysis for third-generation children.  In Section V, we discuss major changes to the CPS 
Hispanic origin and race questions introduced in January 2003 and the impact of these changes 
on ethnic identification and ethnic attrition.  A final section summarizes and concludes. 
 
II.  Data 
  We use microdata from the CPS for all months from January 1994 through December 
2010.  The CPS is a monthly survey of 50,000-60,000 households that the U.S. government 
administers to estimate unemployment rates and other indicators of labor market activity.  In 
addition to the detailed demographic and labor force data reported for all respondents, the CPS 
collects earnings information each month from one-quarter of the sample, the so-called 
“outgoing rotation groups.”  The data we analyze come from these outgoing rotation group 
samples.  The CPS sampling scheme is such that selected residences are surveyed for four 
consecutive months (e.g., January through April), then leave the sample for eight months (e.g., 
May through December), and return for a final four months (e.g., January through April of the 
following year) before exiting the sample for good.  The outgoing rotation groups in a given 
month include those residences that will rotate out of the sample in the following month, either 
temporarily (i.e., those residences completing their fourth month in the CPS sample) or 
permanently (i.e., those residences being surveyed for the eighth and final time).  To avoid 
samples with repeated observations for a given household, we use only data from the first time a   7 
residence appears in an outgoing rotation group (i.e., we use only data from the fourth month that 
a residence appears in the CPS sample).  By pooling together these 17 years of monthly CPS 
data, we substantially increase sample sizes and improve the precision of our estimates.  A key 
feature of CPS data is their inclusion (beginning in 1994) of the information about parental 
countries of birth that is currently missing from the Census and ACS.  As a result, the CPS is 
now the best large-scale, nationally-representative U.S. data set for investigating how outcomes 
vary by immigrant generation. 
  Throughout this paper, we define immigrant generations using information on the 
countries of birth of the respondent, his parents, and (when possible, as described below) his 
grandparents.  The first generation consists of foreign-born individuals (excluding those born 
abroad of an American parent).  The second generation includes U.S.-born individuals who have 
at least one foreign-born parent.  The third generation denotes U.S.-born individuals with two 
U.S.-born parents but at least one foreign-born grandparent.  These immigrant generations are 
defined separately for each of the specific Hispanic and Asian source countries that we consider.  
The Hispanic source countries are Mexico, Puerto Rico, Cuba, El Salvador, and the Dominican 
Republic, and the Asian source countries are China, India, Japan, Korea, and the Philippines.
3  
So, for example, a first-generation Cuban is someone who was born in Cuba and immigrated to 
the United States, and a second-generation Japanese is a U.S.-born individual whose father 
and/or mother were born in Japan.  For second- and third-generation individuals, the source 
country samples defined in this way can overlap somewhat.  A U.S.-born individual with a father 
                                                 
3 These particular countries were chosen because they are important sources of U.S. immigration and they yield CPS 
samples of reasonable size for all three generations.  Persons born in Puerto Rico are U.S. citizens and enjoy unfettered mobility 
between the island and the U.S. mainland, and therefore Puerto Ricans are not, strictly speaking, a U.S. “immigrant” group.  
Nonetheless, island-born Puerto-Ricans who move to the United States and their U.S.-born descendants encounter many of the 
same adjustment issues as conventional immigrant groups.  Accordingly, the socioeconomic mobility of Puerto Ricans is often 
analyzed using models and methods developed to study U.S. immigrant groups (e.g., Feliciano 2001; Hirschman 2001).   8 
born in Mexico and a mother born in El Salvador, for example, will appear in the second-
generation samples for both Mexico and El Salvador.
4 
  The approach described above assigns national origins using the specific countries of 
birth of the respondent and his ancestors.  In contrast, data limitations commonly force 
researchers to adopt an alternative approach whereby self-reported race/ethnicity is used to 
approximate the national origins of immigrant groups, especially for individuals beyond the first 
generation (e.g., in Census or ACS data, second- and higher-generation Asians are U.S.-born 
individuals who subjectively identify as Asian in response to the race question).  A central aim of 
the current paper is to investigate the accuracy of these approximations.  For this purpose, we 
examine the subjective racial/ethnic identification of individuals whose immigrant generation 
and national origins can be determined from the information available in the CPS regarding the 
countries of birth of themselves and their ancestors.  For individuals linked to Hispanic source 
countries, we examine whether they subjectively identify as Hispanic in response to the Hispanic 
origin question in the CPS.
5  For individuals linked to Asian source countries, we examine 
                                                 
4 The overlap in samples is typically quite small.  For our samples of second-generation adults, the percentage who also 
appear in one of the other nine source country samples is below 5 percent for all countries except Cuba (8 percent) and the 
Dominican Republic (20 percent).  For our samples of third-generation children, the percentage who also appear in another 
source country sample is below 10 percent for all countries except Puerto Rico (11 percent), Cuba (16 percent), and the 
Dominican Republic (42 percent).  Most of the overlap for Cubans and Dominicans arises from intermarriage between these 
groups and Puerto Ricans. 
5 Since January 2003, the CPS has collected information about Hispanic origin as follows.  Respondents are asked 
whether they are “Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino,” and those who answer affirmatively are then asked to designate a specific 
Hispanic national origin group (Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Central/South American, or Other Spanish).  The Hispanic origin 
question in the 2000 U.S. Census is similar (Grieco and Cassidy 2001).  Prior to 2003, the CPS elicited Hispanic origin by asking 
respondents to choose their “origin or descent” from a list of about 20 possibilities that included responses such as “Italian,” 
“Polish,” and “Afro-American,” in addition to the specific Hispanic national origin groups listed above (Bowler et al. 2003).  
Responses for the specific Hispanic groups were coded and reported separately in the public use data files, along with a residual 
category that combined into a single group all of the non-Hispanic responses. 
In this paper, we employ the broad indicator of “Hispanic” ethnic identification that potentially applies to all of the 
Hispanic national origin groups.  In previous work that focused on Mexicans (Duncan and Trejo 2007, 2009, 2011), we employed 
the specific indicator for “Mexican” ethnic identification.  In CPS data, the “Hispanic” indicator captures all those who designate 
a specific national origin (such as Mexican, Puerto Rican, or Cuban) as well those who identify as Hispanic but fail to indicate a 
specific national origin.  Therefore, the results reported here may understate the amount of ethnic attrition that would be relevant 
when a particular Hispanic national origin group is the focus of analysis.   9 
whether they subjectively identify as Asian in response to the race question in the CPS.
6 
  To improve the reliability of our measures of subjective racial/ethnic identification, we 
exclude individuals with imputed information regarding Hispanic origin (for analyses of 
Hispanic source countries) or race (for analyses of Asian source countries).  By doing so, we 
avoid confounding true ethnic attrition with errors generated by the CPS imputation process.  To 
more accurately assign immigrant generations, we exclude individuals with missing or imputed 
information regarding the country of birth of themselves or any relevant ancestors.  In particular, 
we exclude all individuals with missing or imputed information regarding their own country of 
birth.  When constructing samples for the second and third generations, we also exclude 
individuals with missing or imputed information regarding the country of birth of either parent, 
and when defining the third generation, we further exclude individuals with missing or imputed 
information regarding the country of birth of any grandparent. 
  In the empirical analyses that follow, we study ethnic attrition among first-, second-, and 
third-generation members of important Hispanic and Asian national origin groups.  We also 
investigate whether such ethnic attrition is selective with respect to educational attainment.  In 
the interests of clarity and transparency, we present our results using simple comparisons of 
identification rates and average years of schooling.  We have performed the corresponding 
regression analyses that control for a number of additional factors, including age, gender, 
geographic location, survey month/year, and who in the household responded to the CPS survey.  
Controlling for these additional factors does not alter the basic pattern of results that we report 
                                                 
6 Unlike the Census and ACS, the CPS race question does not identify specific Asian national origin groups (e.g., 
Chinese, Japanese, Korean, etc.).  Prior to 2003, the relevant race category in the CPS was “Asian or Pacific Islander.”  Starting 
in January 2003, “Asian” and “Hawaiian/Pacific Islander” become separate categories, and respondents can identify with more 
than one race category (Bowler et al. 2003).  For the sake of comparability with the earlier data, from 2003 on we consider 
individuals to identify as Asian if they respond to the CPS race question with “Asian” or ““Hawaiian/Pacific Islander” (or both), 
even if they also give other (i.e., non-Asian) race responses.  Treating multiple race responses in this way will produce 
conservative estimates of ethnic attrition.  In Section V below, we discuss how the 2003 changes in the CPS questionnaire 
affected Hispanic and Asian identification.   10 
here in a more straightforward fashion.  The reported calculations do not employ the CPS 
sampling weights, because these weights are constructed using the information on subjective 
racial/ethnic identification that we treat as endogenous (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2006).  
Nevertheless, weighted calculations produce similar results. 
 
III.  First- and Second-Generation Adults 
  We begin by considering adults between the ages of 25 and 59 who are first- or second-
generation members of the relevant national origin groups.  Tables 1 (for Hispanic source 
countries) and 2 (for Asian source countries) document heterogeneity within immigrant 
generations that has important implications for ethnic identification.  The top half of each table 
provides information for the first generation, including the percentage who arrived in the United 
States as children (i.e., below the age of 16), and how ethnic identification rates vary with age at 
arrival.  The bottom half of each table presents similar information for the second generation; 
namely, the percentage distribution of whether it is the individual’s father, mother, or both who 
was born in the relevant country, and how ethnic identification varies with parental origins.  In 
both tables, standard errors of the identification rates are shown in parentheses, and samples sizes 
are listed by generation for each national origin group. 
  Analyzing data from the 2000 U.S. Census, Rumbaut (2006, Table 2-3) reports a very 
strong correspondence between country of birth and subjective ethnic identification for Hispanic 
immigrants.  Our CPS samples confirm this finding and reveal a similar pattern for Asian 
immigrants.  Overall rates of Hispanic or Asian identification exceed 95 percent for first-
generation adults from all national origin groups except Dominicans (90 percent) and Indians (92 
percent).  As discussed below in Section V, the relatively low rate of Hispanic identification by   11 
Dominican immigrants can be attributed to the indirect way in which the CPS solicited 
information about Hispanic origin prior to 2003.  From 2003 forward, the revised Hispanic origin 
question produces an identification rate of 98 percent for first-generation Dominicans.
7  
Although rates of ethnic identification for immigrants are generally quite high regardless of their 
age at arrival in the United States, for most national origin groups the rates are somewhat lower 
among those who arrived before the age of 16.
8  This pattern is most pronounced for immigrants 
from India and Japan, but it also evident among first-generation individuals from Puerto Rico, 
Cuba, El Salvador, and China.
9  The lower rates of ethnic identification for immigrants who 
arrived as children might reflect more rapid assimilation due to their earlier exposure to the 
English language and U.S. schools, neighborhoods, and other socializing institutions (Oropesa 
and Landale 1997; Bleakley and Chin 2004, 2010). 
  We did not expect to find much ethnic attrition in the first generation, so we are not 
surprised by the high rates of Hispanic and Asian identification among foreign-born adults from 
the relevant source countries.  Ethnic identification rates for the first generation do provide an 
important baseline, however, for measuring ethnic attrition in the second and third generations.  
The fact that immigrants from these Hispanic and Asian countries consistently choose the 
                                                 
7 For immigrants from India, one possibility is that their relatively low rate of Asian identification reflects confusion 
with the CPS race category of “American Indian” (Morning 2001).  Although this category is intended for Native Americans, 
some Asian Indians might mistakenly think it refers to them.  Of the first-generation Indians in our sample who do not self-
identify as Asian, however, only 12 percent instead identify as “American Indian,” and therefore this explanation can account for 
at most a small portion of the observed ethnic attrition.  Among those first-generation Indians who do not self-identify as Asian, 
the overwhelming majority instead report their race as “white,” a pattern that is even stronger for second- and third-generation 
Indians. 
8 In estimating age at arrival in the United States for foreign-born individuals, we use the available information 
regarding the individual’s current age, their year of U.S. arrival, and the survey year.  The CPS reports year of U.S. arrival in 
intervals ranging from two to five years in length, and so we employ the midpoints of these intervals when calculating age at 
arrival. 
9 Our first-generation samples exclude those born abroad of an American parent, so the relatively low rate of Asian 
identification among persons born in Japan who came to the United States before the age of 16 is unlikely to be driven by 
children born to U.S. military personnel stationed in Japan.  Without this exclusion, however, the Asian identification rate is 
below 40 percent for those who were born in Japan and arrived in the United States as children.   12 
expected response suggests that they generally understand the CPS Hispanic origin and race 
questions and do not have difficulty locating where they fit within the implied racial/ethnic 
configuration.  This finding for the first generation also increases the likelihood that any 
significant decline in subjective identification observed for later generations represents true 
ethnic attrition rather than confusion with the CPS questionnaire or unfamiliarity with the U.S. 
racial/ethnic structure. 
  The bottom panels of Tables 1 and 2 provide information on generational complexity and 
ethnic identification for second-generation adults from the same Hispanic and Asian national 
origin groups.  These second-generation members are U.S.-born individuals who have at least 
one parent born in the relevant source country.  Every national origin group exhibits a 
statistically significant reduction in ethnic identification between the first and second 
generations.  By the second generation, overall rates of Hispanic or Asian identification are 
below 83 percent for all national origin groups except Mexicans (95 percent) and Puerto Ricans 
(89 percent).  Identification rates are especially low for second-generation adults from El 
Salvador (22 percent), India (63 percent), and Japan (67 percent). 
  To highlight these patterns, Figure 1 graphs the overall ethnic attrition rates for first- and 
second-generation adults from each national origin group.  The ethnic attrition rate represents the 
percentage of individuals who do not subjectively identify as Hispanic or Asian (whichever 
would be expected for their national origin group).  As such, the ethnic attrition rates displayed 
in Figure 1 are complements of the corresponding ethnic identification rates reported in Tables 1 
and 2 (i.e., the ethnic attrition rate equals 100 minus the ethnic identification rate).
10  Figure 1 
makes clear the sharp rise in ethnic attrition that occurs between the first and second generations 
                                                 
10 The standard error of an ethnic attrition rate is identical to the standard error of the corresponding ethnic 
identification rate.  Therefore, Tables 1 and 2 provide standard errors for the ethnic attrition rates shown in Figure 1.   13 
for every national origin group, and it also shows that for most groups sizeable rates of ethnic 
attrition (approaching 20 percent or more) emerge as early as the second generation.  Evidently, 
the ethnic attrition we studied previously for second-generation Mexicans (Duncan and Trejo 
2011) is just the tip of the iceberg, as other second-generation groups have substantially higher 
rates of attrition. 
  Tables 1 and 2 also demonstrate that the structure of ethnic origins varies enormously 
across second-generation groups.  For example, the percentage of second-generation adults with 
both parents rather than just one parent born in the source country ranges from 67 percent for 
Puerto Ricans and 63 percent for Indians down to 15 percent for Japanese and 13 percent for 
Salvadorans.  The corresponding rate is 39 percent for Koreans and close to 50 percent for the 
remaining five groups.  Moreover, generational complexity is strongly related to subjective 
ethnic identification.  For all second-generation groups, rates of ethnic identification are much 
lower for individuals with just one parent born in the source country.  Indians and Salvadorans 
provide the most extreme examples of this pattern, with ethnic identification being the norm for 
those with two parents born in the source country (rates of 86 percent for Indians and 76 percent 
for Salvadorans) but uncommon for those with just one parent born in the source country (26 
percent for Indians and 14 percent for Salvadorans). 
  Figure 2 displays the corresponding ethnic attrition rates for second-generation adults, 
distinguished by whether both parents, only the father, or only the mother was born in the source 
country.  These graphs reaffirm the relatively low ethnic attrition rates for second-generation 
adults with both parents born in the relevant country, but they also reveal interesting patterns 
among second-generation adults with mixed parental origins (the so-called 2.5 generation).  For 
second-generation Hispanics with only one parent born in the source country, ethnic attrition   14 
rates are similar regardless of whether that parent is the father or the mother.  This is not the case 
for Asian national origin groups, however, with generally much less ethnic attrition among those 
second-generation adults whose father rather than mother was born in the relevant country 
(Koreans are the lone exception, as they exhibit the opposite pattern).  Moreover, Tables 1 and 2 
document important differences between national origin groups in the chances that second-
generation individuals have immigrant fathers or immigrant mothers (or both).  As a result, the 
wide variation across groups both in generational complexity and in rates of ethnic identification 
conditional on parental origins generates the substantial differences we observe in the overall 
percentage of second-generation adults who identify with the relevant ethnic group. 
  We have shown that, despite uniformly high rates of ethnic identification for first-
generation adults, several of the Hispanic and all of the Asian national origin groups studied here 
exhibit significant amounts of ethnic attrition in the second generation.  We have also shown that 
this ethnic attrition primarily reflects much lower rates of ethnic identification for those 
individuals with only one parent (rather than both) born in the source country.  For ethnic 
attrition to distort standard measures of generational progress for immigrant groups, however, it 
is not enough that such attrition be sizeable; the attrition must also be selective on socioeconomic 
attainment.  To provide some initial evidence on the selectivity of ethnic attrition, Table 3 reports 
average completed years of schooling by ethnic identification for second-generation adults from 
each of our Hispanic and Asian national origin groups.  Standard errors are shown in 
parentheses. 
  Table 3 reveals an interesting pattern in how the educational selectivity of ethnic attrition 
varies across second-generation groups.  For Mexicans and Puerto Ricans, groups with the 
lowest average schooling levels, adults not identified as Hispanic tend to be much better   15 
educated than those who do identify as Hispanic.  In particular, second-generation Puerto Ricans 
who fail to identify as Hispanic average almost three-quarters of a year more education than their 
counterparts who do so identify, and the analogous schooling gap for second-generation 
Mexicans approaches a full year.  Precisely the opposite pattern, however, emerges for the most 
educated groups:  Chinese and Indians.  Within these groups, education levels are significantly 
lower for second-generation adults who do not provide the expected Asian identification.  
Finally, groups with intermediate levels of education tend to exhibit little or no selectivity by 
ethnic identification (e.g., Cubans, Dominicans, and Filipinos). 
  Our previous research for Mexicans (Duncan and Trejo 2007, 2011) suggests that 
selective ethnic attrition causes most analyses to understate the socioeconomic attainment of the 
U.S.-born descendants of Mexican immigrants, because this population usually must be 
identified by their subjective responses to questions about ethnic origins.  Table 3 indicates that a 
similar conclusion holds for Puerto Ricans and Salvadorans.  On the other hand, Table 3 reveals 
the reverse bias for most Asian groups (with Filipinos being the notable exception), which 
suggests that ethnic attrition inflates observed schooling levels for the U.S.-born descendants of 
Asian immigrants.  This pattern is of theoretical as well as empirical interest.  Some theories of 
interethnic marriage (e.g., Furtado 2006, 2011) predict that members of high-attainment groups 
who intermarry should be negatively selected in terms of attainment, whereas the corresponding 
selectivity should be positive for intermarried members of low-attainment groups.
11  The pattern 
                                                 
11 Furtado’s model emphasizes how the supplies of potential spouses vary with ethnic-specific schooling distributions 
in marriage markets where individuals hope to match on both education and ethnicity.  A college-educated Mexican American, 
for example, may choose to intermarry because of the relative scarcity of other Mexican ethnics with a college degree.  Asian 
Americans tend to be overrepresented on college campuses, however, so for these groups it may instead be the less-educated 
individuals that face a more difficult time finding co-ethnics to marry within their education group.  Consequently, this model 
predicts that members of high-education groups who intermarry should be negatively selected in terms of education, whereas the 
selectivity should be positive for intermarried members of low-education groups.  Because intermarriage is a fundamental source 
of ethnic attrition, the differences across groups in intermarriage selectivity predicted by Furtado’s model can generate 
corresponding differences in the selectivity of ethnic attrition.   16 
of educational selectivity evident in Table 3 is broadly consistent with this prediction, given that 
ethnic attrition is more likely for children produced by intermarriages (Lieberson and Waters 
1988; Duncan and Trejo 2007, 2009, 2011). 
 
IV.  Third-Generation Children 
  By matching second-generation individuals in the CPS with their spouses and children, 
we can push this analysis one step further and learn something about complexity and ethnic 
attrition in the third generation.  For children living with both parents, the survey data collected 
from the parents reveal the countries of birth of each child’s grandparents.  With this 
information, we can now formulate a more precise definition of the third generation, as opposed 
to the standard definition that relies on subjective racial/ethnic identification and does not 
distinguish the true third generation from higher generations.  Our third-generation samples 
include U.S.-born children ages 17 and below who live in intact families and have two U.S.-born 
parents (ages 18 and above) but at least one grandparent born in the relevant source country.
12  
We limit the samples to children in married, intact families because complete information 
regarding grandparents’ countries of birth is available only for children living in the same 
household as both of their parents. 
  At the outset, let us acknowledge some important limitations of our analysis of third-
generation children.  First, because we must restrict attention to children in married, intact 
families, our samples are not representative of all third-generation children.  Available evidence 
suggests that endogamy is more prevalent in marriage than in cohabitation and in out-of-wedlock 
childbearing, so restricting our samples to married, intact families is likely to understate the 
                                                 
12 Our samples of third-generation children include siblings from the same set of parents.  When we avoid repeated 
observations within families by retaining only the youngest child from each family, sample sizes fall by roughly half, but the 
results remain very similar to those reported below using the full samples.   17 
extent of ethnic attrition.  After reviewing the relevant literature, Perlmann and Waters (2004, p. 
275) conclude that “formal marriage and the children born in wedlock provide us with a 
conservative view of the degree of intermixing—both in terms of interethnic couples and in 
terms of the production of mixed-ancestry children.” 
  Second, the analyses we report do not distinguish children with step or adoptive parents 
from those with biological parents.  Not until 2007 does the CPS collect the information 
necessary to make such distinctions.  Using only the data from 2007 forward, we find that for 
most national origin groups around 10 percent of the third-generation children in our samples 
have at least one non-biological parent, with the rates ranging from under 2 percent for Chinese 
and Indians to 17 percent for Salvadorans.  When we limit our analyses to children with two 
biological parents, rates of Hispanic and Asian identification typically rise, but only modestly 
(i.e., by a few percentage points), and the educational selectivity of ethnic attrition does not 
change. 
  Third, we base our measures of subjective ethnic identification for third-generation 
children on their responses to the CPS Hispanic origin and race questions, but these responses 
primarily represent a parent or other adult member of the household answering for the child.  A 
critical issue is whether these children will give similar responses when they become adults and 
answer for themselves.
13  Fourth, because the CPS does not provide informative measures of 
attainment for children, we analyze the selectivity of ethnic attrition among third-generation 
children somewhat indirectly, by examining the education levels of their parents.  Finally, for 
some of the national origin groups, the samples of third-generation children are small.
14  Note 
                                                 
13 See Portes and Rumbaut (2001, chapter 7) for a discussion of parental and other influences on the evolving ethnic 
identities of second-generation adolescents. 
14 For example, third-generation sample sizes are 209 for Dominicans, 170 for Indians, and 269 for Koreans (see Table 
4).   18 
that none of these limitations apply to the analysis of ethnic attrition among first- and second-
generation adults that we presented in the preceding section.  Individuals born in a foreign 
country or with a foreign-born parent are likely to retain relatively strong ethnic attachments, 
however, so by focusing only on the first and second generations we would miss the more 
extensive ethnic attrition that may occur in later generations.  Therefore, despite its limitations, 
we believe our analysis of ethnic attrition in the third generation provides a useful empirical 
glimpse into a potentially significant topic about which little is currently known. 
  For third-generation children from each of our Hispanic and Asian source countries, 
Table 4 reports information pertaining to generational complexity and its relationship to 
subjective ethnic identification.  In particular, the table shows the percentage distribution of 
third-generation children by how many of their grandparents were born in the relevant country, 
and the table also indicates how the ethnic identification of these children varies with this 
indicator of generational complexity.  For every national origin group, the vast majority of third-
generation children have only one or two grandparents who were born in that country, rather than 
three or four.  Almost 80 percent of Mexicans and Puerto Ricans, roughly 90 percent of Cubans, 
Dominicans, Chinese, and Filipinos, and an even greater percentage of third-generation children 
from the remaining national origin groups have no more than two immigrant grandparents from 
the relevant country.  Note that this complexity of grandparents’ origins has two sources: 
interethnic marriage, and marriage between different generations of the same ethnicity.
15  The 
only way that a third-generation Mexican child can have three or four of his grandparents born in 
Mexico, for example, is if both parents are second-generation Mexicans (i.e., the mother and 
father are both the U.S.-born children of Mexican immigrants).  By contrast, if a second-
                                                 
15 Lichter, Carmalt, and Qian (2011) discuss the prevalence and implications of cross-generational marriage among 
Hispanics.  Min and Kim (2009) do the same for Asians.   19 
generation Mexican marries either a non-Mexican or a later-generation Mexican (i.e., a Mexican 
American from the third generation or beyond), then the children resulting from such a marriage 
can have at most two Mexican-born grandparents. 
  Table 4 shows that this generational complexity is closely related to children’s subjective 
ethnic identification.  Children with three or four grandparents born in the source country are 
very likely to report the corresponding ethnic identification, but identification rates are 
dramatically lower for the bulk of third-generation children who have only one or two immigrant 
grandparents and therefore weaker ethnic ties.  Furthermore, for every national origin group, 
ethnic attrition is much greater for the third-generation children in Table 4 than for the first- and 
second-generation adults in Tables 1 and 2.  Although this pattern is expected, the magnitude of 
ethnic attrition in the third generation is striking nonetheless.  Except for the overall Hispanic 
identification rates of 81 percent for Mexicans and 70 percent for Dominicans, standard 
measures of ethnic identification capture less than two-thirds of the Hispanic and Asian children 
in our samples.  Only 11 percent of the children with one or more grandparents born in El 
Salvador identify as Hispanic, and less than a third of the analogous Indian children identify as 
Asian, so analyses of the U.S.-born members of these groups using conventional Census and 
CPS data sets are likely to miss large segments of the target populations. 
  In Table 4, heterogeneity among third-generation children is measured by how many of 
their grandparents were born in the relevant country.  Table 5 provides a somewhat different 
perspective on generational complexity, by distinguishing third-generation children according to 
whether their ethnicity derives from both the paternal and maternal sides of their family rather 
than just from one side.  For example, we define a third-generation Mexican child to have 
Hispanic ethnicity on his father’s side of the family if at least one of the following two things is   20 
true:  (1) the child has a paternal grandparent who was born in Mexico, or (2) the child’s father 
self-identifies as Hispanic.  In an analogous fashion, the countries of birth of the maternal 
grandparents and the mother’s subjective ethnic identification determine whether a third-
generation Mexican child has Hispanic ethnicity on his mother’s side of the family.  By 
construction, all of the children in our third-generation samples have at least one grandparent 
born in the source country, so they all have the relevant ethnicity on at least one side of their 
family.  The issue is whether the CPS data give any indication that a child also has this ethnicity 
on the other side of his family.  In this way, we distinguish third-generation children by whether 
they are the products of ethnic in-marriage (i.e., children with the relevant ethnicity on both sides 
of their family) or ethnic intermarriage (i.e., children with the relevant ethnicity on only one side 
of their family). 
  Table 5 shows that mixed ethnic origins are widespread among third-generation Hispanic 
and Asian children.  Forty percent of Mexican children have Hispanic ethnicity on only one side 
of their family, and the corresponding proportion is well over half for every other national origin 
group, with particularly high rates for Koreans (84 percent), Salvadorans (90 percent), and 
Indians (92 percent).  In general, mixed origins are more common for third-generation children 
from Asian compared to Hispanic national origin groups, with three Hispanic groups (Mexicans, 
Dominicans, and Puerto Ricans) exhibiting much lower prevalence of ethnic intermarriage than 
any of the Asian groups. 
  Table 5 also indicates that ethnic intermarriage is the primary source of ethnic attrition in 
the third generation.  Among third-generation children with the relevant ethnicity on both sides 
of their family, ethnic identification rates exceed 90 percent for all national origin groups except 
Salvadorans (who have an identification rate of 74 percent).  For every group, however, ethnic   21 
identification rates are markedly lower for children whose ethnicity originates from just one side 
of their family.  Among third-generation children of mixed ethnic origins, these identification 
rates range from a minimum of 4 percent for Salvadorans to a maximum of 55 percent for 
Mexicans, with rates of 37-52 percent for other Hispanic groups and 26-42 percent for Asian 
groups.  This pattern is highlighted in Figure 3, which illustrates the corresponding rates of 
ethnic attrition.  For third-generation children from every national origin group, ethnic attrition is 
low when both parents share the same ethnicity and strikingly higher when the parents come 
from different ethnic backgrounds.  Clearly, the sizeable amount of ethnic attrition observed in 
our third-generation samples is concentrated among children who are the products of interethnic 
marriage. 
  In order to learn something about the selectivity of ethnic attrition for third-generation 
children, Table 6 shows how parental education varies with whether or not the child reports the 
relevant ethnic identification.  The pattern of selectivity is similar to what we saw in Table 3 for 
second-generation adults.  For the largest Hispanic groups (Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and 
Salvadorans), third-generation children who do not identify as Hispanic enjoy advantaged 
backgrounds (i.e., fathers and mothers with more schooling, on average) compared to their peers 
who do identify as Hispanic.  For all Asian groups except for Filipinos, however, the selectivity 
runs in the opposite direction.  Consider, for example, third-generation children from India.  
Overall, these children’s parents average about 16 years of education, but average parental 
education exceeds 17 years in the relatively small (31 percent of the total) and select subsample 
of Indian children who identify as Asian.  As a result, the indicator for an Asian race response 
commonly employed in analyses of Census and CPS data captures a highly skewed sample of 
third-generation Indian Americans.   22 
  This selectivity (with respect to parental education) of ethnic attrition has two possible 
sources.  First, because ethnic attrition predominately occurs among children who are the 
products of interethnic marriage, the educational selectivity of intermarriage is a potential source 
of parental education differences between third-generation children who do and do not provide 
the expected subjective identification.  Second, within the subsample of intermarried families, 
ethnic identification of children might be selective on parental education.  Table 7 sheds light on 
both the magnitude and the direction of these two sources of selectivity for each of the Hispanic 
and Asian national origin groups.  The first source, intermarriage selectivity, is captured by 
differences in average parental education between children with the relevant ethnicity on only 
one side of their family and those with the relevant ethnic origins on both sides of their family.  
The second source, selective ethnic identification within intermarried families, is captured by 
how parental education varies with the child’s subjective ethnic identification among those 
children who have the relevant ethnicity on just one side of their family. 
  Table 7 reveals interesting differences between Hispanics and Asians.  For third-
generation children from Hispanic national origin groups, the selectivity of ethnic attrition is 
driven primarily by the first source of selectivity (intermarriage selectivity), because the second 
source (selective ethnic identification within intermarried families) tends to be negligible.  
Moreover, intermarriage selectivity runs in the same direction (positive) for all Hispanic groups.  
For Asians, however, the patterns are more complicated, as both sources of selectivity are 
typically operative, and the direction of selectivity varies across national origin groups and 
sometimes differs between the two sources of selectivity for a given group. 
  For every Hispanic national origin group, Table 7 shows that average parental education 
is substantially higher for third-generation children with Hispanic ethnicity on just one side of   23 
their family than for the corresponding children with Hispanic ethnicity on both sides of their 
family.  In other words, the educational selectivity of intermarriage is positive for every Hispanic 
group.  Furthermore, for every Hispanic group except Dominicans, average parental education 
does not vary much with the child’s ethnic identification among those third-generation children 
with Hispanic ethnicity on just one side of their family.
16  For most Hispanic groups, in other 
words, ethnic identification within intermarried families is not selective on parental education.  
As a result, for Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Salvadorans, the overall positive educational 
selectivity of ethnic attrition observed in Table 6 derives from the positive educational selectivity 
of intermarriage.  For these three Hispanic groups with relatively low levels of schooling, this 
positive educational selectivity of intermarriage is consistent with the theoretical predictions by 
Furtado (2006, 2011) that were discussed in the preceding section.  In contrast, Table 6 shows 
that ethnic attrition among third-generation children is associated with little or no educational 
selectivity for Cuban mothers and Dominican fathers and with negative educational selectivity 
for Dominican mothers.  In these cases, the positive educational selectivity of intermarriage is 
countered by a negative educational selectivity of non-Hispanic identification within 
intermarried families. 
  Different patterns emerge for third-generation children from Asian national origin 
groups.  Table 7 indicates that the educational selectivity of intermarriage is positive for Chinese 
and Filipinos, but it is negative for Indians, Japanese, and Koreans.  For every Asian group, 
however, the educational selectivity of non-Asian identification within intermarried families is 
strongly negative.  In other words, within the subsample of third-generation children with Asian 
                                                 
16 Cubans fit this pattern for father’s education, but not for mother’s education.  For Cuban mothers and for Dominican 
parents of either sex, average parental education is lower for children who fail to identify as Hispanic (within the subsample of 
third-generation children with mixed ethnic origins).  Therefore, for Cubans and Dominicans, there is some evidence that the 
educational selectivity of non-Hispanic identification is negative among intermarried families.   24 
identification on only one side of their family, average parental education is markedly lower for 
children who fail to identify as Asian.  This educational difference is particularly large among 
Indians, Japanese, and Koreans—the Asian groups for which the educational selectivity of 
intermarriage is negative—and so for these groups both sources of selectivity reinforce each 
other to produce the decidedly negative educational selectivity of ethnic attrition observed in 
Table 6.  In contrast, for Chinese and Filipinos—the Asian groups that exhibit a positive 
educational selectivity of intermarriage—the two sources of selectivity work in opposite 
directions, resulting in an overall selectivity of ethnic attrition that is negative for Chinese and 
insignificant for Filipinos. 
  In general, patterns of ethnic attrition for third-generation children are similar to those for 
second-generation adults reported earlier.  These similarities are reassuring, given that our 
analysis of third-generation children suffers from the limitations mentioned at the beginning of 
this section.  Moreover, studying third-generation children has provided some new insights, in 
part because of the more detailed information about ethnic origins available for such children.  
First of all, ethnic attrition is much more prevalent in the third generation than in the second, an 
important though perhaps unsurprising finding.  Second, both the source and the direction of 
selective ethnic attrition differ between Hispanics and Asians.  For Hispanics, the educational 
selectivity of ethnic attrition is driven primarily by the selectivity of intermarriage.  As predicted 
by Furtado (2006, 2011), the educational selectivity of intermarriage (and therefore of ethnic 
attrition) is strongly positive for the Hispanic groups with the lowest levels of education 
(Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Salvadorans).  Intermarriage selectivity is also present for Asians, 
but it is not as important as the educational selectivity of non-Asian identification within 
intermarried families, which is negative for every Asian group.  As a result, the educational   25 
selectivity of ethnic attrition is negative for every Asian group except Filipinos.  This finding for 
Asians—that third-generation children with better-educated parents tend to retain stronger ethnic 
ties—is consistent with the possibility of “selective acculturation” that the theory of segmented 
assimilation posits for some immigrant groups (Portes and Zhou 1993; Portes and Rumbaut 
2001). 
 
V.  Impact of 2003 Changes in the CPS Questionnaire 
  As noted earlier (see footnotes 4 and 5), major changes to the CPS questions regarding 
Hispanic origin and race were introduced in the January 2003 survey (Bowler et al. 2003).  In 
this section, we compare data from before and after these changes in order to assess their 
potential impacts on ethnic identification. 
  Prior to 2003, the CPS collected information on Hispanic origin in a rather indirect 
fashion.  Respondents were asked to choose their “origin or descent” from a flash card listing 
about 20 options.  Just over half of these options represented European ancestries (such as 
“German” or “Swedish”), another option was “Afro-American,” and there was a residual 
category for “another group not listed.”  The remaining options were meant to capture Hispanics.  
Three separate options were available for those of Mexican descent (“Mexican-American,” 
“Chicano,” and “Mexican”), and the options for non-Mexican Hispanics included “Puerto 
Rican,” “Cuban,” “Central or South American (Hispanic Countries),” and “Other Hispanic.”  For 
our purposes, it is important to note that “Salvadoran” and “Dominican” were not listed 
explicitly as options.  Presumably, Salvadorans were expected to choose the “Central or South 
American” option, and Dominicans were expected to choose “Other Hispanic.”  Starting in 2003, 
the CPS Hispanic origin question was changed to a format similar to that introduced in the 2000   26 
U.S. Census and also adopted by the ACS.  Respondents are now asked directly whether they are 
“Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino,” and those who answer affirmatively are then given the 
opportunity to designate a specific national origin group (Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, 
Central/South American, or Other Spanish). 
  Beginning in January 2003, the CPS race question also was changed to be similar to the 
2000 Census race question.  The most significant revision is that respondents can now choose 
more than one race, whereas previously only a single race response was allowed.
17  In addition, 
the ordering of the Hispanic origin and race items on the questionnaire was switched.  Prior to 
the 2003 CPS (or the 2000 Census), the race question preceded the Hispanic origin question.  
Now, the Hispanic origin question precedes the race question.
18 
  We anticipate that these changes to the CPS questionnaire will raise ethnic identification 
and lower ethnic attrition for our samples of Hispanic and Asian national origin groups.  The 
revised Hispanic origin question now directly asks about “Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino” 
ethnicity, which could improve identification for all Hispanic national origin groups, because the 
pre-2003 version of this question was not clear about its intent to identify Hispanics.  We might 
expect to see the largest jumps in Hispanic identification for groups such as Salvadorans and 
Dominicans that were not listed explicitly as options in the previous version of the Hispanic 
origin question.  The revised race question allows for multiple responses, which could increase 
Asian identification among multiracial Asians who previously may have given a non-Asian 
response when they were forced select a single race.  Because Asians have relatively high rates 
of multiracial identification (Jones and Symens Smith 2001), their answers to the race question 
                                                 
17 In contrast, the Hispanic origin question continues to permit only a single response.  For example, respondents are 
not allowed to indicate that they are both “Mexican” and “Puerto Rican”. 
18 To a large extent, the changes to the race question in the CPS echo the revisions that had been made to the 
corresponding question in the 2000 Census.  See Grieco and Cassidy (2001) for a discussion of the race and Hispanic origin 
questions in the 2000 Census.   27 
might be particularly sensitive to permitting multiple responses.
19 
  For three groups with large enough samples to produce reasonably precise estimates by 
CPS survey year, Figure 4 illustrates the noticeable impact of the 2003 questionnaire changes on 
ethnic attrition.  For each group, Figure 4 plots ethnic attrition rates calculated separately by 
survey year, with these annual rates displayed as dots.
20  The dashed vertical line distinguishes 
rates from before and after the CPS questionnaire changes that were introduced at the start of 
2003, and the solid horizontal lines represent average ethnic attrition rates for the relevant “pre” 
(1994-2002) and “post” (2003-2010) regimes. 
  The top panel of Figure 4 shows ethnic attrition rates for first-generation Dominican 
adults.  Under the pre-2003 version of the CPS Hispanic origin question, annual rates of ethnic 
attrition for Dominican immigrants range from 12 to 30 percent, with an average of about 18 
percent.  After the 2003 changes to the Hispanic origin question, however, the corresponding 
annual rates never exceed 4 percent, and the average ethnic attrition rate drops to 2 percent.  
Evidently, the questionnaire changes have raised Hispanic identification and lowered ethnic 
attrition among first-generation Dominicans, and by a substantial amount.  Under the revised 
Hispanic origin question, ethnic attrition becomes negligible for U.S. immigrants from the 
Dominican Republic, notwithstanding several factors—such as phenotype, language, and home 
country conceptions of race/ethnicity quite different from those in the United States—that 
complicate ethnic identification for Dominicans (Bailey 2001; Itzigsohn, Giorguli, and Vazquez 
                                                 
19 Using the CPS data from 2003 and later, we can calculate the percentage of individuals who answer the race question 
with multiple responses that include both Asian and non-Asian responses.  This measure of the multiracial Asian population 
provides an indication of the extent to which Asians in our samples might have been affected by the pre-2003 requirement to 
select a single race.  For second-generation adults from Asian national origin groups, the proportion of multiracial Asians ranges 
from 4 percent for Indians and 7 percent for Chinese to just over 20 percent for Japanese and Koreans.  For third-generation 
children, the corresponding rates are substantially higher, ranging from 26 percent for Indians to 40 percent for Koreans. 
20 Recall that the ethnic attrition rate equals 100 minus the corresponding ethnic identification rate.   28 
2005).
21  Among first-generation adults, Dominicans are the only national origin group to exhibit 
such a dramatic shift in ethnic identification before and after the 2003 changes in the CPS 
questionnaire.  Only two other first-generation groups show statistically significant movement in 
the average rate of ethnic attrition before and after the questionnaire changes, and for these 
groups the declines in ethnic attrition are more modest (for Salvadorans, the rate of ethnic 
attrition falls from 5 percent before 2003 to 2 percent afterward, and the corresponding reduction 
for Indians is from 11 to 7 percent). 
  The middle panel of Figure 4 displays a similar graph for second-generation Puerto Rican 
adults who have only one of their parents (rather than both) born in Puerto Rico.  Because the 
rate of ethnic attrition is only 4 percent (see Figure 2) among second-generation adults with both 
parents born in Puerto Rico, we choose to focus here on those with mixed parental origins for 
whom ethnic attrition is more prevalent.  Once again, we see a discernible reduction in ethnic 
attrition after the CPS questionnaire changes are introduced in 2003.  From 1994-2002, the 
annual rates of ethnic attrition for second-generation adults with just one parent born in Puerto 
Rico vary between 28-39 percent, whereas from 2003-2010 the comparable range is 12-26 
percent.  The average rate of ethnic attrition is cut in half, falling from 34 percent before 2003 to 
17 percent from 2003 forward. 
  The bottom panel of Figure 4 tells a similar story for third-generation Mexican children 
with Hispanic ethnicity on just one side of their family.
22  The average rate of ethnic attrition 
                                                 
21 Our findings for Dominican immigrants corroborate the corresponding results in del Pinal and Schmidley (2005), 
who matched respondents from the 2000 CPS (for the months of February through May) with the information that these same 
individuals provided in the 2000 U.S. Census (conducted in April).  With their matched sample, del Pinal and Schmidley can 
compare how these individuals answered the Hispanic origin and race questions in both the 2000 CPS (which employed the 
earlier version of these questions) and the 2000 Census (which introduced the significant changes to these questions described 
above).  Among those born in the Dominican Republic, the rate of Hispanic identification was much higher when responding to 
the 2000 Census (94 percent) than to the 2000 CPS (79 percent). 
22 Third-generation Mexican children with Hispanic ethnicity on both sides of their family have an ethnic attrition rate 
of only 2 percent (see Figure 3), and this rate is very similar before and after the 2003 changes in the CPS questionnaire.   29 
plunges from 62 percent during 1994-2002 down to 28 percent in the 2003-2010 data, with 
annual rates that do not stray too far from the relevant average in each time period.  Indeed, the 
lowest annual rate of ethnic attrition observed in the pre-2003 period (55 percent in 1998) far 
exceeds the highest annual rate observed afterward (32 percent in 2007).  The middle and bottom 
panels of Figure 4 indicate that, even for groups such as Puerto Ricans and Mexicans that were 
listed explicitly as options in the pre-2003 CPS Hispanic origin question, the more direct version 
of this question adopted in 2003 can substantially reduce ethnic attrition among second- and 
third-generation individuals with mixed parental origins. 
  The other groups of second- and third-generation individuals with mixed parental origins 
also experienced declines in ethnic attrition following the 2003 questionnaire changes, but 
smaller sample sizes make the annual estimates rather noisy for most of these groups.  To 
provide an informative picture of the overall patterns, Figures 5 and 6 compare average rates of 
ethnic attrition before (1994-2002) and after (2003-2010) the CPS revision.
23  Figure 5 pertains 
to second-generation adults with only one parent born in the relevant country, and Figure 6 is for 
third-generation children with the relevant ethnicity on only one side of their family.  The figures 
make clear that the 2003 changes to the CPS Hispanic origin and race questions produced 
pervasive impacts on Hispanic and Asian identification.  For U.S.-born individuals with mixed 
parental origins from every one of our source country samples, the 2003 questionnaire changes 
reduce ethnic attrition.  Among second-generation adults, these declines are particularly large for 
Salvadorans and Indians, the two groups with the highest initial rates of ethnic attrition.  Among 
third-generation children, ethnic attrition falls by a substantial amount for every national origin 
group, with the biggest reductions occurring for Hispanic groups (except Salvadorans). 
                                                 
23 Appendix Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3 report the ethnic identification rates that constitute the raw data for these figures, 
along with additional information such as standard errors, sample sizes, and the corresponding rates for other subgroups and for 
first-generation adults.   30 
  Figures 5 and 6 focus on individuals with mixed parental origins, because ethnic attrition 
predominately occurs in this population.  For most national origin groups, ethnic attrition rates 
are close to zero for second-generation adults with both parents born in the relevant country (see 
Figure 2) and for third-generation children with the relevant ethnicity on both sides of their 
family (see Figure 3), and so for these groups there is not much scope for the CPS questionnaire 
changes to lower attrition (see Tables A.2 and A.3).  For those groups, however, with sizeable 
attrition even among individuals whose ethnicity originates from both parents, the 2003 
questionnaire changes did reduce ethnic attrition.  For example, among second-generation adults 
with both parents born in the relevant country, ethnic attrition rates fell for Salvadorans (from 51 
to 5 percent), Dominicans (from 21 to 5 percent), and Indians (from 20 to 12 percent).  Similarly, 
among third-generation children with Hispanic ethnicity on both sides of their family, attrition 
rates declined for Puerto Ricans (from 11 to 4 percent), Salvadorans (from 42 to 0 percent), and 
Dominicans (from 17 to 0 percent).
24 
  As mentioned previously, the most straightforward explanation for why the revised CPS 
race question increases Asian identification and thereby lowers ethnic attrition among Asian 
national origin groups is that, by recording multiple responses, the revised question picks up 
some multiracial Asians who previously gave a non-Asian response when they were forced 
select a single race.  If this were the only way that the revised race question affected Asian 
identification, then the size of the multiracial Asian population provides a rough upper bound on 
how much the revised question can lower ethnic attrition among Asians.  Using CPS data for 
2003-2010, we can measure the prevalence of multiracial responses for each of our Asian groups 
(see footnote 18), and these measurements generally are consistent with the observed changes in 
                                                 
24 See Tables A.2 and A.3.   31 
ethnic attrition.  For example, 22 percent of second-generation Korean adults give both Asian 
and non-Asian responses to the race question in the 2003-2010 CPS data, and this prevalence of 
multiracial Asian identification is high enough to potentially account for the 7 percentage point 
decline in the overall ethnic attrition rate for second-generation Koreans (from 26 percent in 
1994-2002 to 19 percent in 2003-2010) following the CPS questionnaire changes.  The only 
Asian national origin group to go against form is Indians.  The rates of multiracial identification 
for second-generation Indian adults (4 percent) and third-generation Indian children (26 percent) 
are too low to explain the corresponding declines in overall ethnic attrition observed following 
the questionnaire changes:  a 23 percentage point decline for second-generation adults (from 52 
to 29 percent) and a 28 percentage point decline for third-generation children (from 88 to 60 
percent).  This finding suggests that aspects of the CPS questionnaire changes besides allowing 
multiple race responses may have had an impact on the propensity for Indians to identify as 
Asian.
25 
  In this section, we have documented that the 2003 changes to the CPS Hispanic origin 
and race questions have produced substantially lower rates of ethnic attrition for second- and 
third-generation Hispanics and Asians.
26  By asking directly about Hispanic ethnicity and by 
allowing multiple race responses, the CPS now elicits higher rates of subjective ethnic 
identification among the descendants of Hispanic and Asian immigrants.  Ethnic attrition 
remains a significant problem, however, even in the 2003-2010 CPS data derived from the 
improved questionnaire.  In these data, overall rates of ethnic attrition remain sizeable for 
second-generation members of some Hispanics groups (16 percent for Cubans and 40 percent for 
                                                 
25 We must caution, however, that our samples of second- and third-generation Indians are relatively small, and so 
estimates of these ethnic attrition rates are somewhat imprecise (see Tables A.2 and A.3). 
26 We also investigated whether these changes to the CPS questionnaire altered the educational selectivity of ethnic 
attrition.  Although some of the estimates are imprecise, in general the patterns of selectivity are similar before and after the 
questionnaire changes, and these patterns conform to those described in Sections III and IV.   32 
Salvadorans) and all Asian groups (approaching 20 percent for Chinese, Koreans, and Filipinos, 
and around 30 percent for Indians and Japanese).  For third-generation children, the 
corresponding rates vary from 12 percent for Mexicans to over 60 percent for Salvadorans and 
Indians, with Cubans and the remaining Asian groups all in the 35-50 percent range.
27  Because 
the Hispanic origin and race questions introduced in the 2003 CPS are similar to the analogous 
questions employed in the Census and ACS from 2000 forward, the issues pertaining to 
subjective identification and selective ethnic attrition that we have explored here with CPS data 
will likely also be relevant for Census and ACS data.  Unfortunately, the lack of information 
about parental countries of birth makes these issues difficult to study or address in the Census 
and ACS. 
  Studies of Hispanics and Asians often ignore variation across national origin groups and 
instead examine these populations as pan-ethnic aggregates.  Indeed, analyses of Asian-
American adults beyond the second generation typically have no other choice (e.g., Takei and 
Sakamoto 2011), because the CPS race question does not identify specific Asian national origin 
groups.  As a way of summarizing our findings and highlighting some of the potential 
implications, Table 8 (for Hispanics) and Table 9 (for Asians) report rates of ethnic identification 
and levels of average education when our source country samples are pooled together to create 
pan-ethnic aggregates.
28  These results are presented separately by immigrant generation (i.e., 
first-generation adults, second-generation adults, and third-generation children) and by time 
                                                 
27 See Tables A.2 and A.3. 
28 As noted previously, the samples of second-generation adults and third-generation children overlap somewhat across 
source countries, due to individuals with mixed origins (e.g., a third-generation child with one grandparent born in Puerto Rico 
and another grandparent born in the Dominican Republic).  The aggregated, pan-ethnic samples of Hispanics constructed for 
Tables 8 count each individual only once, and so do the pan-ethnic samples of Asians constructed for Table 9 (although there 
remains a tiny amount of overlap between the Hispanic and Asian pan-ethnic samples, because of a few individuals with both 
Hispanic and Asian ancestry).  Based on 2000 Census data, the five national origin groups we include here in our pan-ethnic 
Hispanic samples account for over three-quarters of the U.S. Hispanic population (Guzman 2001), and the analogous statement 
holds for the five national origin groups included in our pan-ethnic Asian samples (Barnes and Bennett 2002).   33 
period (i.e., the entire span or our data, 1994-2010, as well as a split that distinguishes data from 
before and after the major changes to the Hispanic origin and race questions introduced in 
January 2003). 
  Using data from all available years (1994-2010), the first column of numbers in Table 8 
shows that the aggregate ethnic identification rates for individuals from our five Hispanic source 
countries decline from 98 percent for first-generation adults to 87 percent for second-generation 
adults to 67 percent for third-generation children.  The corresponding column in Table 9 
documents an even steeper decline in ethnic identification for individuals from the five Asian 
source countries:  from 96 percent for the first generation to 75 percent for the second and 50 
percent for the third.  Among the descendants of Hispanic immigrants, average schooling is 
markedly higher for those who do not self-identify as Hispanic, whereas the educational 
selectivity of ethnic attrition runs in the opposite direction for Asians.  As a result, average years 
of education for the pan-ethnic Hispanic samples increase by about .1 for second-generation 
adults and .2-.3 for the parents of third-generation children when the samples are expanded to 
include the relevant individuals who do not identify as Hispanic.  In contrast, expanding the pan-
ethnic Asian samples in this way leads to reductions in average schooling levels that are similar 
in magnitude to the increases observed for Hispanics. 
  The remaining columns of Tables 8 and 9 illustrate at this aggregated level the impact of 
the 2003 changes in the CPS questionnaire.  For Hispanics, rates of ethnic identification rise 
across the time periods before and after the questionnaire changes from 82 to 93 percent for 
second-generation adults and from 56 to 81 percent for third-generation children.  For Asians, 
the corresponding increases are somewhat smaller, from 72 to 78 percent for second-generation 
adults and from 41 to 57 percent for third-generation children.  The educational selectivity of   34 
ethnic attrition remains similar before are after the questionnaire changes, but the reduced rates 
of ethnic attrition following these changes imply that measurement biases from subjective ethnic 
identification are less of a problem in the 2003 and later CPS data.  Therefore, one lesson from 
this analysis is to avoid using, whenever possible, CPS data from before 2003 when studying 
immigrant generations.  Another lesson is that, even in CPS data from 2003 and later, 
measurement biases from subjective ethnic identification may lead standard analyses to 
understate the socioeconomic attainment of the U.S.-born descendants of Hispanic immigrants 
and overstate the corresponding outcomes for Asian Americans. 
 
VI.  Conclusion 
  Because of data limitations, research on the U.S.-born descendants of Hispanic and Asian 
immigrants often must identify the populations of interest using subjective measures of 
racial/ethnic identification (Sakamoto, Wu, and Tzeng 2000; Snipp and Hirschman 2004; Zeng 
and Xie 2004; Saenz 2005; Duncan, Hotz, and Trejo 2006).  In particular, this approach is 
typically the only feasible option for studies that seek to examine long-term integration by 
distinguishing immigrant descendants in the third and higher generations (Rong and Grant 1992; 
Borjas 1994; Trejo 1997, 2003; Goyette and Xie 1999; Farley and Alba 2002; Grogger and Trejo 
2002; Yang 2004; Smith 2006; Blau and Kahn 2007).  A potential problem with this approach is 
that assimilation and intermarriage can cause ethnic attachments to fade across generations (Alba 
1990; Waters; 1990; Perlmann and Waters 2007), and therefore subjective measures of 
racial/ethnic identification might miss a significant portion of the later-generation descendants of 
immigrants.  Furthermore, if such ethnic attrition is selective on socioeconomic attainment, then 
it can distort assessments of integration and generational progress.   35 
  Using 1994-2010 CPS data, we explore this issue for a wide range of national origin 
groups from important Hispanic (Mexico, Puerto Rico, Cuba, El Salvador, and the Dominican 
Republic) and Asian (China, India, Japan, Korea, and the Philippines) source countries.  We 
measure ethnic attrition by analyzing the subjective racial/ethnic identification of individuals 
whose immigrant generation and national origins can be determined from the information 
available in the CPS regarding the countries of birth of themselves and their ancestors.  For 
individuals linked to Hispanic source countries, we examine whether they subjectively identify 
as Hispanic in response to the Hispanic origin question, and for individuals linked to Asian 
source countries, we examine whether they subjectively identify as Asian in response to the race 
question.  We conduct this analysis for three immigrant generations:  first-generation adults (i.e., 
U.S. immigrants ages 25-59 who were born in the relevant source country), second-generation 
adults (i.e., U.S.-born individuals ages 25-59 who have at least one parent born in the relevant 
source country), and third-generation children (i.e., U.S.-born children ages 17 and below who 
live in intact families and have two U.S.-born parents but at least one grandparent born in the 
relevant source country).
29  So, for example, the ethnic attrition rate for second-generation 
Cubans represents the percentage who do not subjectively identify as Hispanic within our sample 
of U.S.-born adults with a parent born in Cuba. 
  We find little ethnic attrition in the first generation, which indicates that immigrants from 
these Hispanic and Asian countries generally understand the CPS Hispanic origin and race 
questions and consistently provide the expected responses.  By the second generation, however, 
sizeable rates of ethnic attrition (approaching 20 percent or more) emerge for most groups, with 
lower rates for Mexicans (5 percent) and Puerto Ricans (11 percent).  Attrition rates are 
                                                 
29 In CPS data, complete information regarding grandparents’ countries of birth is available only for children living in 
the same household as both of their parents, which is why our third-generation samples are limited to children in married, intact 
families.   36 
dramatically higher for third-generation children, ranging from 19 percent for Mexicans and 30 
percent for Dominicans to around 40 percent for Puerto Ricans and Chinese and close to 50 
percent or more for the remaining groups (including rates of 69 percent for Indians and 89 
percent for Salvadorans).  Consequently, standard analyses that must rely on subjective 
racial/ethnic identification to detect the later-generation descendants of immigrants may miss 
large segments of the target populations.  We also find that mixed ethnic origins are common 
among third-generation Hispanic and Asian children, and we demonstrate that ethnic attrition 
predominately occurs in children with mixed parental origins.  Among third-generation children 
with the relevant ethnicity on both the paternal and maternal sides of their family, ethnic attrition 
rates are below 10 percent (and often well below) for all groups except Salvadorans (who have a 
rate of 26 percent).  For every group, however, attrition is substantial among children whose 
ethnicity originates from only one side of their family (rates that range from 45-74 percent for 
nine of the ten groups, with a rate of 96 percent for Salvadorans). 
  In addition, we present evidence on the educational selectivity of ethnic attrition.  Similar 
patterns of selectivity are observed for second-generation adults and third-generation children, 
but there are interesting differences between Hispanics and Asians.
30  For most Hispanic national 
origin groups, the educational selectivity of ethnic attrition is positive (i.e., average parental 
education is higher for third-generation children who do not subjectively identify as Hispanic), 
and this selectivity arises primarily because Hispanics who marry non-Hispanics tend to have 
higher education levels than Hispanics who marry endogamously.  Conversely, the educational 
selectivity of ethnic attrition is negative for Asian groups (except Filipinos, who show no 
significant selectivity), and the principal source of this selectivity is that, within intermarried 
                                                 
30 The CPS does not provide informative measures of attainment for children, so we analyze the selectivity of ethnic 
attrition among third-generation children by examining the education levels of their parents.   37 
families, average parental education is markedly lower for children who fail to identify as Asian.  
This last finding for Asians—that third-generation children with better-educated parents retain 
stronger ethnic ties—is consistent with the possibility of “selective acculturation” that the theory 
of segmented assimilation posits for some immigrant groups (Portes and Zhou 1993; Portes and 
Rumbaut 2001).  The overall pattern that the educational selectivity of intermarriage (and of 
ethnic attrition) tends to be positive for low-education Hispanic groups and negative for high-
education Asian groups is consistent with Furtado’s (2006, 2011) model of interethnic marriage.   
Regardless of the theoretical explanation, our empirical results suggest that ethnic attrition 
generates measurement biases that vary across national origin groups in direction as well as 
magnitude, and that correcting for these biases is likely to raise the socioeconomic standing of 
the U.S.-born descendants of most Hispanic immigrants relative to their Asian counterparts.  Our 
results, however, shed more light on the direction rather than the ultimate magnitude of these 
measurement biases, and so at this point we cannot say whether correcting for selective ethnic 
attrition would produce a small or large improvement in the relative attainment of later-
generation Hispanics. 
  Finally, we document that major changes to the CPS Hispanic origin and race questions 
adopted in 2003 have produced substantially lower rates of ethnic attrition for second- and third-
generation Hispanics and Asians.  By asking directly about Hispanic ethnicity and by allowing 
multiple race responses, the CPS now elicits higher rates of subjective ethnic identification 
among the descendants of Hispanic and Asian immigrants.  Ethnic attrition remains a significant 
problem, however, even in CPS data collected using the improved questionnaire.  In these data, 
overall rates of ethnic attrition remain sizeable for second-generation members of some 
Hispanics groups (Cubans and Salvadorans) and all Asian groups, and for these same groups the   38 
corresponding rates among third-generation children exceed 35 percent.  Because the Hispanic 
origin and race questions introduced in the 2003 CPS are similar to the analogous questions 
employed in the Census and ACS from 2000 forward, the issues pertaining to subjective 
identification and selective ethnic attrition that we have explored here with CPS data will likely 
also be relevant for Census and ACS data.  Unfortunately, the lack of information about parental 
countries of birth makes these issues difficult to study or address in the Census and ACS. 
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B. Asian Countries 
Figure 2:  Ethnic Attrition Rates of Second-Generation Adults,  
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B. Asian Countries 













































































B.  Second-Generation Puerto Ricans with Only One     


















C.  Third-Generation Mexicans with Hispanic Ethnicity
on Only One Side of Their Family 
Figure 5:  Ethnic Attrition Rates of Second-Generation Adults with Only One Parent 



















































































B. Asian Countries 
Figure 6:  Ethnic Attrition Rates of Third-Generation Children with the  



















































































B. Asian Countries 
Table 1:  Ethnic Identification of First- and Second-Generation Adults from  
Hispanic Countries 
 
        Puerto        El    Dominican 
    Mexico    Rico    Cuba    Salvador    Republic 
First Generation                     
Percent with:                     
   Age at immigration ≥ 16    77.9    54.7    62.9    82.9    80.1 
   Age at immigration < 16    22.1    45.3    37.1    17.1    18.9 
Total    100.0    100.0    100.0    100.0    100.0 
                     
Percent identified as Hispanic:                     
   Age at immigration ≥ 16    99.0    97.7    98.7    97.4    89.7 
    (0.05)    (0.2)    (0.2)    (0.2)    (0.5) 
   Age at immigration < 16    98.7    94.7    96.4    94.2    90.6 
    (0.1)    (0.4)    (0.4)    (0.7)    (1.0) 
   All    98.9    96.4    97.8    96.9    89.9 
    (0.04)    (0.2)    (0.2)    (0.2)    (0.4) 
                     
Sample size    56,295    8,084    4,773    6,621    4,737 
                     
Second Generation                     
Percent with:                     
   Both parents born in country    53.1    67.4    51.7    13.1    54.0 
   Father only born in country    26.8    19.3    26.8    39.7    21.7 
   Mother only born in country    20.1    13.3    21.4    47.2    24.4 
Total    100.0    100.0    100.0    100.0    100.0 
                     
Percent identified as Hispanic:                     
   Both parents born in country    97.9    95.6    94.8    76.4    88.3 
    (0.2)    (0.3)    (0.8)    (3.0)    (1.7) 
   Father only born in country    91.7    74.9    68.6    11.9    76.8 
    (0.4)    (1.2)    (2.2)    (1.3)    (3.4) 
   Mother only born in country    89.8    74.4    68.4    16.2    76.5 
    (0.6)    (1.5)    (2.5)    (1.4)    (3.3) 
   All    94.6    88.7    82.1    22.4    82.9 
    (0.2)    (0.4)    (0.9)    (1.1)    (1.4) 
                     
Sample size    14,015    6,379    1,651    1,520    697 
 
Source:  1994-2010 CPS data. 
Note:  Standard errors are shown in parentheses.  The samples include individuals ages 25-59.  The first generation 
consists of individuals born in the relevant source country (excluding those born abroad of an American parent).  
The second generation denotes U.S.-born individuals who have at least one parent born in the relevant source 
country.  
Table 2:  Ethnic Identification of First- and Second-Generation Adults from  
Asian Countries 
 
    China    India    Japan    Korea    Philippines 
First Generation                     
Percent with:                     
   Age at immigration ≥ 16    90.3    91.4    91.4    81.9    82.1 
   Age at immigration < 16    9.7    8.6    8.6    18.1    17.9 
Total    100.0    100.0    100.0    100.0    100.0 
                     
Percent identified as Asian:                     
   Age at immigration ≥ 16    98.5    92.0    97.6    98.5    95.8 
    (0.2)    (0.3)    (0.3)    (0.2)    (0.2) 
   Age at immigration < 16    95.2    85.5    86.6    97.2    96.0 
    (0.8)    (1.4)    (2.5)    (0.5)    (0.4) 
   All    98.2    91.5    96.6    98.3    95.9 
    (0.2)    (0.3)    (0.4)    (0.2)    (0.2) 
                     
Sample size    6,874    7,709    2,178    5,209    10,626 
                     
Second Generation                     
Percent with:                     
   Both parents born in country    53.6    62.5    15.0    39.0    49.7 
   Father only born in country    27.4    24.3    20.2    8.3    29.0 
   Mother only born in country    19.0    13.3    64.8    52.7    21.3 
Total    100.0    100.0    100.0    100.0    100.0 
                     
Percent identified as Asian:                     
   Both parents born in country    95.4    85.5    97.7    97.4    95.2 
    (0.7)    (1.8)    (1.0)    (1.0)    (0.6) 
   Father only born in country    72.6    31.3    73.3    58.0    68.7 
    (2.2)    (3.8)    (2.6)    (7.1)    (1.7) 
   Mother only born in country    57.5    15.9    58.4    68.5    48.9 
    (2.9)    (4.1)    (1.6)    (2.6)    (2.1) 
   All    81.9    63.1    67.3    78.9    77.6 
    (1.0)    (1.9)    (1.2)    (1.7)    (0.8) 
                     
Sample size    1,572    618    1,484    602    2,648 
 
Source:  1994-2010 CPS data. 
Note:  Standard errors are shown in parentheses.  The samples include individuals ages 25-59.  The first generation 
consists of individuals born in the relevant source country (excluding those born abroad of an American parent).  
The second generation denotes U.S.-born individuals who have at least one parent born in the relevant source 
country.  
Table 3:  Education of Second-Generation Adults, by Ethnic Identification 
 
A.  Hispanic Countries        Puerto        El    Dominican 
    Mexico    Rico    Cuba    Salvador    Republic 
Average years of education:                     
   Identified as Hispanic    12.41    12.64    14.26    13.15    13.44 
    (0.02)    (0.03)    (0.07)    (0.14)    (0.10) 
   Not identified as Hispanic    13.35    13.35    14.36    13.42    13.42 
    (0.09)    (0.09)    (0.13)    (0.07)    (0.17) 
   All    12.46    12.72    14.28    13.36    13.43 
    (0.02)    (0.03)    (0.06)    (0.06)    (0.09) 
                     
B.  Asian Countries                     
    China    India    Japan    Korea    Philippines 
Average years of education:                     
   Identified as Asian    15.65    16.66    14.43    15.02    14.09 
    (0.06)    (0.08)    (0.07)    (0.10)    (0.05) 
   Not identified as Asian    15.02    15.23    13.99    14.36    14.06 
    (0.14)    (0.16)    (0.09)    (0.18)    (0.09) 
   All    15.53    16.13    14.29    14.88    14.08 
    (0.05)    (0.08)    (0.06)    (0.09)    (0.04) 
 
Source:  1994-2010 CPS data. 
Note:  Standard errors are shown in parentheses.  The samples include U.S.-born individuals ages 25-59 who have at 
least one parent born in the relevant source country.  
Table 4:  Ethnic Identification of Third-Generation Children,  
by Nativity of Grandparents 
 
A.  Hispanic Countries        Puerto        El    Dominican 
    Mexico    Rico    Cuba    Salvador    Republic 
Percent with:                     
   3 or 4 grandparents born in country    20.6    21.9    11.3    1.4    10.1 
   2 grandparents born in country    33.4    40.2    37.4    5.5    43.1 
   1 grandparent born in country    46.0    37.9    51.3    93.1    46.9 
Total    100.0    100.0    100.0    100.0    100.0 
                     
Percent identified as Hispanic:                     
   3 or 4 grandparents born in country    97.5    93.8    91.5    33.3    90.5 
    (0.4)    (1.0)    (2.9)    (12.6)    (6.6) 
   2 grandparents born in country    85.6    59.3    55.8    48.3    76.7 
    (0.7)    (1.5)    (2.8)    (6.5)    (4.5) 
   1 grandparent born in country    70.4    45.7    39.8    8.4    59.2 
    (0.8)    (1.6)    (2.4)    (0.9)    (5.0) 
   All    81.1    61.7    51.6    11.0    69.9 
    (0.5)    (1.0)    (1.7)    (0.9)    (3.2) 
                     
Sample size    6,818    2,564    829    1,086    209 
                     
B.  Asian Countries                     
    China    India    Japan    Korea    Philippines 
Percent with:                     
   3 or 4 grandparents born in country    11.2    5.9    1.2    2.2    8.2 
   2 grandparents born in country    36.5    42.4    6.8    14.1    33.1 
   1 grandparent born in country    52.4    51.8    92.0    83.6    58.7 
Total    100.0    100.0    100.0    100.0    100.0 
                     
Percent identified as Asian:                     
   3 or 4 grandparents born in country    90.0    90.0    100.0    100.0    100.0 
    (3.6)    (10.0)    (0.0)    (0.0)    (0.0) 
   2 grandparents born in country    72.9    48.6    76.0    86.8    71.9 
    (2.9)    (5.9)    (6.1)    (5.6)    (2.2) 
   1 grandparent born in country    40.4    10.2    40.0    40.9    36.6 
    (2.7)    (3.2)    (1.9)    (3.3)    (1.8) 
   All    57.8    31.2    43.2    48.7    53.5 
    (2.0)    (3.6)    (1.8)    (3.1)    (1.4) 
                     
Sample size    628    170    739    269    1,226 
 
Source:  1994-2010 CPS data. 
Note:  Standard errors are shown in parentheses.  The samples include U.S.-born children ages 17 and below who 
live in intact families and have two U.S.-born parents but at least one grandparent born in the relevant source 
country.  
Table 5:  Ethnic Identification of Third-Generation Children,  
by Source of Ethnicity 
 
A.  Hispanic Countries        Puerto        El    Dominican 
    Mexico    Rico    Cuba    Salvador    Republic 
Percent who are:                     
   Hispanic on both sides of family    60.1    38.9    27.1    10.0    45.5 
   Hispanic on one side of family only    39.9    61.1    72.9    90.0    54.5 
Total    100.0    100.0    100.0    100.0    100.0 
                     
Percent identified as Hispanic:                     
   Hispanic on both sides of family    98.2    92.0    91.6    74.3    91.6 
    (0.2)    (0.9)    (1.9)    (4.2)    (2.9) 
   Hispanic on one side of family only    55.2    42.4    36.8    3.9    51.8 
    (1.0)    (1.2)    (2.0)    (0.6)    (4.7) 
   All    81.1    61.7    51.6    11.0    69.9 
    (0.5)    (1.0)    (1.7)    (0.9)    (3.2) 
                     
B.  Asian Countries                     
    China    India    Japan    Korea    Philippines 
Percent who are:                     
   Asian on both sides of family    29.8    7.6    22.9    16.4    30.2 
   Asian on one side of family only    70.2    92.4    77.1    83.6    69.8 
Total    100.0    100.0    100.0    100.0    100.0 
                     
Percent identified as Asian:                     
   Asian on both sides of family    95.7    92.3    98.2    100.0    97.3 
    (1.5)    (7.7)    (1.0)    (0.0)    (0.8) 
   Asian on one side of family only    41.7    26.1    26.8    38.7    34.6 
    (2.4)    (3.5)    (1.9)    (3.3)    (1.6) 
   All    57.8    31.2    43.2    48.7    53.5 
    (2.0)    (3.6)    (1.8)    (3.1)    (1.4) 
 
Source:  1994-2010 CPS data. 
Note:  Standard errors are shown in parentheses.  The samples include U.S.-born children ages 17 and below who 
live in intact families and have two U.S.-born parents but at least one grandparent born in the relevant source 
country.  
Table 6:  Parental Education of Third-Generation Children,  
by Child’s Ethnic Identification 
 
A.  Hispanic Countries        Puerto        El    Dominican 
    Mexico    Rico    Cuba    Salvador    Republic 
Average education of fathers:                     
   Child identified as Hispanic    12.53    12.98    14.37    12.76    13.58 
    (0.03)    (0.05)    (0.11)    (0.19)    (0.17) 
   Child not identified as Hispanic    13.57    13.54    14.63    13.59    13.59 
    (0.06)    (0.07)    (0.13)    (0.08)    (0.29) 
   All    12.73    13.20    14.50    13.50    13.58 
    (0.03)    (0.04)    (0.08)    (0.07)    (0.14) 
Average education of mothers:                     
   Child identified as Hispanic    12.59    13.07    14.25    13.02    13.89 
    (0.03)    (0.05)    (0.11)    (0.16)    (0.17) 
   Child not identified as Hispanic    13.38    13.46    14.15    13.39    13.41 
    (0.06)    (0.07)    (0.11)    (0.07)    (0.23) 
   All    12.74    13.22    14.20    13.35    13.75 
    (0.03)    (0.04)    (0.08)    (0.06)    (0.14) 
                     
B.  Asian Countries                     
    China    India    Japan    Korea    Philippines 
Average education of fathers:                     
   Child identified as Asian    15.95    17.04    14.78    15.18    14.01 
    (0.10)    (0.24)    (0.13)    (0.20)    (0.08) 
   Child not identified as Asian    15.53    15.56    13.89    14.30    14.18 
    (0.16)    (0.21)    (0.11)    (0.19)    (0.09) 
   All    15.77    16.02    14.28    14.72    14.09 
    (0.09)    (0.17)    (0.08)    (0.14)    (0.06) 
Average education of mothers:                     
   Child identified as Asian    15.79    17.17    14.87    14.90    14.26 
    (0.10)    (0.22)    (0.13)    (0.21)    (0.07) 
   Child not identified as Asian    15.28    15.64    13.79    14.30    14.00 
    (0.15)    (0.21)    (0.10)    (0.18)    (0.09) 
   All    15.57    16.12    14.26    14.59    14.14 
    (0.09)    (0.17)    (0.08)    (0.14)    (0.06) 
 
Source:  1994-2010 CPS data. 
Note:  Standard errors are shown in parentheses.  The samples include U.S.-born children ages 17 and below who 
live in intact families and have two U.S.-born parents but at least one grandparent born in the relevant source 
country.  
Table 7:  Parental Education of Third-Generation Children, by Source of Ethnicity  
and Child’s Ethnic Identification 
 
A.  Hispanic Countries        Puerto        El    Dominican 
    Mexico    Rico    Cuba    Salvador    Republic 
Average education of fathers:                     
   Hispanic on both sides of family    12.18    12.48    14.03    12.92    13.09 
    (0.04)    (0.06)    (0.15)    (0.22)    (0.18) 
   Hispanic on one side of family only    13.55    13.65    14.67    13.56    13.99 
    (0.04)    (0.05)    (0.10)    (0.07)    (0.21) 
      Child identified as Hispanic    13.48    13.65    14.68    13.55    14.19 
    (0.06)    (0.08)    (0.16)    (0.28)    (0.28) 
      Child not identified as Hispanic    13.64    13.65    14.66    13.56    13.78 
    (0.06)    (0.07)    (0.13)    (0.08)    (0.31) 
Average education of mothers:                     
   Hispanic on both sides of family    12.29    12.65    13.83    13.06    13.36 
    (0.03)    (0.06)    (0.15)    (0.18)    (0.21) 
   Hispanic on one side of family only    13.41    13.59    14.34    13.38    14.07 
    (0.04)    (0.05)    (0.09)    (0.07)    (0.17) 
      Child identified as Hispanic    13.42    13.65    14.63    13.32    14.66 
    (0.05)    (0.08)    (0.15)    (0.27)    (0.22) 
      Child not identified as Hispanic    13.40    13.54    14.17    13.38    13.44 
    (0.06)    (0.07)    (0.11)    (0.07)    (0.25) 
                     
B.  Asian Countries                     
    China    India    Japan    Korea    Philippines 
Average education of fathers:                     
   Asian on both sides of family    15.60    16.77    14.50    14.93    13.65 
    (0.18)    (0.62)    (0.17)    (0.35)    (0.10) 
   Asian on one side of family only    15.85    15.96    14.21    14.68    14.28 
    (0.11)    (0.18)    (0.10)    (0.15)    (0.07) 
      Child identified as Asian    16.02    17.15    15.04    15.30    14.46 
    (0.15)    (0.25)    (0.19)    (0.24)    (0.12) 
      Child not identified as Asian    15.72    15.54    13.90    14.30    14.19 
    (0.15)    (0.21)    (0.11)    (0.19)    (0.09) 
Average education of mothers:                     
   Asian on both sides of family    15.13    16.46    14.70    15.00    14.02 
    (0.17)    (0.61)    (0.17)    (0.36)    (0.10) 
   Asian on one side of family only    15.76    16.09    14.12    14.52    14.19 
    (0.10)    (0.18)    (0.09)    (0.15)    (0.07) 
      Child identified as Asian    16.17    17.37    14.99    14.85    14.55 
    (0.14)    (0.20)    (0.20)    (0.26)    (0.11) 
      Child not identified as Asian    15.47    15.64    13.80    14.30    14.00 
    (0.13)    (0.21)    (0.10)    (0.18)    (0.09) 
 
Source:  1994-2010 CPS data. 
Note:  Standard errors are shown in parentheses.  The samples include U.S.-born children ages 17 and below who 
live in intact families and have two U.S.-born parents but at least one grandparent born in the relevant source 
country.  
Table 8:  Aggregate Estimates of the Incidence and Selectivity of Ethnic Identification  
for Hispanics, by Generation and Survey Year 
 
    1994-2010    1994-2002    2003-2010 
First-Generation Adults             
Percent identified as Hispanic    97.91    97.01    98.62 
    (0.05)    (0.09)    (0.06) 
Average years of education:             
   Identified as Hispanic    9.56    9.28    9.78 
    (0.01)    (0.02)    (0.02) 
   Not identified as Hispanic    11.13    11.17    11.05 
    (0.10)    (0.12)    (0.17) 
   All    9.60    9.34    9.80 
    (0.01)    (0.02)    (0.02) 
Second-Generation Adults             
Percent identified as Hispanic    87.28    81.54    92.55 
    (0.22)    (0.36)    (0.24) 
Average years of education:             
   Identified as Hispanic    12.62    12.37    12.83 
    (0.02)    (0.03)    (0.02) 
   Not identified as Hispanic    13.47    13.42    13.60 
    (0.04)    (0.05)    (0.07) 
   All    12.73    12.56    12.89 
    (0.02)    (0.03)    (0.02) 
Third-Generation Children             
Percent identified as Hispanic    67.33    55.55    80.67 
    (0.44)    (0.65)    (0.55) 
Average education of fathers:             
   Child identified as Hispanic    12.75    12.39    13.03 
    (0.03)    (0.04)    (0.03) 
   Child not identified as Hispanic    13.67    13.59    13.90 
    (0.04)    (0.04)    (0.08) 
   All    13.05    12.92    13.20 
    (0.02)    (0.03)    (0.03) 
Average education of mothers:             
   Child identified as Hispanic    12.81    12.38    13.14 
    (0.03)    (0.04)    (0.03) 
   Child not identified as Hispanic    13.48    13.33    13.89 
    (0.03)    (0.04)    (0.07) 
   All    13.03    12.80    13.28 
    (0.02)    (0.03)    (0.03) 
 
Source:  1994-2010 CPS data. 
Note:  Standard errors are shown in parentheses.  For these calculations, Hispanic source countries are Mexico, 
Puerto Rico, Cuba, El Salvador, and the Dominican Republic.  First-generation adults are individuals ages 25-59 
who were born in an Hispanic source country (excluding those born abroad of an American parent).  Second-
generation adults are U.S.-born individuals ages 25-59 who have at least one parent born in an Hispanic source 
country.  Third-generation children are U.S.-born individuals ages 17 and below who live in intact families and have 
two U.S.-born parents but at least one grandparent born in an Hispanic source country.  The sample sizes across all 
years (1994-2010) are as follows:  80,510 for first-generation adults, 23,881 for second-generation adults, and 
11,139 for third-generation children.  
Table 9:  Aggregate Estimates of the Incidence and Selectivity of Ethnic Identification  
for Asians, by Generation and Survey Year 
 
    1994-2010    1994-2002    2003-2010 
First-Generation Adults             
Percent identified as Asian    95.74    95.28    96.15 
    (0.11)    (0.17)    (0.15) 
Average years of education:             
   Identified as Asian    14.64    14.37    14.88 
    (0.02)    (0.03)    (0.02) 
   Not identified as Asian    14.70    14.65    14.75 
    (0.08)    (0.11)    (0.10) 
   All    14.64    14.38    14.87 
    (0.02)    (0.03)    (0.02) 
Second-Generation Adults             
Percent identified as Asian    75.15    71.83    77.70 
    (0.52)    (0.82)    (0.67) 
Average years of education:             
   Identified as Asian    14.81    14.60    14.96 
    (0.03)    (0.05)    (0.04) 
   Not identified as Asian    14.37    14.33    14.41 
    (0.05)    (0.08)    (0.08) 
   All    14.70    14.52    14.84 
    (0.03)    (0.04)    (0.04) 
Third-Generation Children             
Percent identified as Asian    49.58    40.76    56.52 
    (0.92)    (1.36)    (1.22) 
Average education of fathers:             
   Child identified as Asian    14.83    14.57    14.98 
    (0.06)    (0.10)    (0.07) 
   Child not identified as Asian    14.44    14.38    14.50 
    (0.06)    (0.09)    (0.09) 
   All    14.63    14.45    14.77 
    (0.04)    (0.06)    (0.06) 
Average education of mothers:             
   Child identified as Asian    14.90    14.70    15.01 
    (0.06)    (0.09)    (0.07) 
   Child not identified as Asian    14.31    14.13    14.50 
    (0.06)    (0.08)    (0.08) 
   All    14.60    14.36    14.79 
    (0.04)    (0.06)    (0.05) 
 
Source:  1994-2010 CPS data. 
Note:  Standard errors are shown in parentheses.  For these calculations, Asian source countries are China, India, 
Japan, Korea, and the Philippines.  First-generation adults are individuals ages 25-59 who were born in an Asian 
source country (excluding those born abroad of an American parent).  Second-generation adults are U.S.-born 
individuals ages 25-59 who have at least one parent born in an Asian source country.  Third-generation children are 
U.S.-born individuals ages 17 and below who live in intact families and have two U.S.-born parents but at least one 
grandparent born in an Asian source country.  The sample sizes across all years (1994-2010) are as follows:  32,596 
for first-generation adults, 6,870 for second-generation adults, and 2,975 for third-generation children. 
  
Appendix Table A.1:  Ethnic Identification of First-Generation Adults, by Survey Year 
 
A.  Hispanic Countries     
Mexico 
   
Puerto Rico 
   
Cuba 
   
El Salvador 
  Dominican 
Republic 




















Percent identified as Hispanic:                                         
   Age at immigration ≥ 16    99.0    99.0    97.4    98.1    98.7    98.6    95.8    98.7    81.6    98.3 
    (0.1)    (0.1)    (0.3)    (0.3)    (0.3)    (0.3)    (0.4)    (0.2)    (0.9)    (0.3) 
   Age at immigration < 16    98.6    98.7    94.0    95.5    96.2    96.8    88.2    97.9    82.6    96.9 
    (0.2)    (0.1)    (0.5)    (0.5)    (0.6)    (0.6)    (1.6)    (0.5)    (1.9)    (0.8) 
   All    98.9    98.9    95.9    96.9    97.7    98.0    94.7    98.5    81.8    98.0 
    (0.1)    (0.1)    (0.3)    (0.3)    (0.3)    (0.3)    (0.4)    (0.2)    (0.8)    (0.3) 
                                         
Sample size    23,655    32,640    4,325    3,759    2,511    2,262    2,805    3,816    2,367    2,370 
                                         
B.  Asian Countries    China    India    Japan    Korea    Philippines 




















Percent identified as Asian:                                         
   Age at immigration ≥ 16    98.7    98.2    89.2    94.0    97.4    97.8    98.2    98.8    95.9    95.8 
    (0.2)    (0.2)    (0.6)    (0.4)    (0.5)    (0.5)    (0.3)    (0.2)    (0.3)    (0.3) 
   Age at immigration < 16    94.0    96.1    82.5    87.6    88.9    84.5    97.2    97.3    95.9    96.1 
    (1.4)    (1.0)    (2.3)    (1.7)    (3.3)    (3.7)    (0.9)    (0.7)    (0.7)    (0.6) 
   All    98.3    98.0    88.6    93.5    96.8    96.5    98.0    98.5    95.9    95.9 
    (0.2)    (0.2)    (0.6)    (0.4)    (0.5)    (0.6)    (0.3)    (0.2)    (0.3)    (0.3) 
                                         
Sample size    3,188    3,686    3,207    4,502    1,216    962    2,505    2,704    5,088    5,538 
 
Source:  1994-2010 CPS data. 
Note:  Standard errors are shown in parentheses.  The samples include individuals ages 25-59 born in the relevant source country (excluding those born abroad of 
an American parent).  
Appendix Table A.2:  Ethnic Identification of Second-Generation Adults, by Survey Year 
 
A.  Hispanic Countries     
Mexico 
   
Puerto Rico 
   
Cuba 
   
El Salvador 
  Dominican 
Republic 




















Percent identified as Hispanic:                                         
   Both parents born in country    97.8    97.9    94.8    96.3    95.8    94.0    48.8    95.0    78.6    95.4 
    (0.3)    (0.2)    (0.5)    (0.4)    (1.0)    (1.1)    (5.6)    (2.0)    (3.3)    (1.4) 
   Father only born in country    89.7    93.6    65.6    82.5    61.4    75.8    6.4    28.3    74.0    79.5 
    (0.7)    (0.6)    (2.0)    (1.5)    (3.3)    (2.9)    (1.2)    (3.7)    (5.2)    (4.6) 
   Mother only born in country    88.0    91.6    65.5    82.6    64.5    71.3    7.7    65.1    63.6    84.6 
    (0.9)    (0.7)    (2.4)    (1.8)    (3.9)    (3.2)    (1.1)    (4.7)    (6.0)    (3.6) 
   All    93.2    95.7    85.8    91.6    79.8    84.2    10.1    59.7    74.2    89.5 
    (0.3)    (0.2)    (0.6)    (0.5)    (1.4)    (1.2)    (0.9)    (2.5)    (2.5)    (1.5) 
                                         
Sample size    6,241    7,774    3,126    3,253    773    878    1,143    377    298    399 
                                         
B.  Asian Countries    China    India    Japan    Korea    Philippines 




















Percent identified as Asian:                                         
   Both parents born in country    97.0    93.8    80.2    87.6    97.7    97.9   100.0    96.3    93.8    96.1 
    (0.8)    (1.1)    (3.8)    (2.0)    (1.3)    (1.5)    (0.0)    (1.5)    (1.1)    (0.7) 
   Father only born in country    66.8    77.6    14.5    43.2    81.4    63.2    46.7    62.9    66.7    70.9 
    (3.3)    (2.8)    (4.5)    (5.3)    (3.0)    (4.2)    (13.3)    (8.3)    (2.3)    (2.4) 
   Mother only born in country    50.8    62.6    7.9    22.7    52.7    63.5    55.6    72.9    39.9    54.6 
    (4.4)    (3.7)    (4.4)    (6.4)    (2.4)    (2.1)    (5.6)    (2.9)    (3.3)    (2.7) 
   All    80.7    83.1    47.9    71.0    66.8    67.8    73.8    80.9    73.7    80.6 
    (1.5)    (1.3)    (3.4)    (2.3)    (1.7)    (1.7)    (3.4)    (1.9)    (1.3)    (1.0) 
                                         
Sample size    734    838    211    407    747    737    168    434    1,142    1,506 
 
Source:  1994-2010 CPS data. 
Note:  Standard errors are shown in parentheses.  The samples include U.S.-born individuals ages 25-59 who have at least one parent born in the relevant source 
country.  
Appendix Table A.3:  Ethnic Identification of Third-Generation Children, by Survey Year 
 
A.  Hispanic Countries     
Mexico 
   
Puerto Rico 
   
Cuba 
   
El Salvador 
  Dominican 
Republic 




















Percent identified as Hispanic:                                         
   Hispanic on both sides of family    98.0    98.4    88.7    95.9    91.3    91.8    57.6   100.0    83.0   100.0 
    (0.3)    (0.3)    (1.4)    (0.9)    (2.8)    (2.5)    (6.1)    (0.0)    (5.5)    (0.0) 
   Hispanic on one side of family only    38.8    71.7    23.4    62.2    21.8    52.4    1.1    18.1    20.0    72.5 
    (1.3)    (1.2)    (1.5)    (1.8)    (2.4)    (2.9)    (0.4)    (3.1)    (6.0)    (5.4) 
   All    74.0    87.9    49.7    74.8    39.2    63.9    5.3    35.5    52.2    83.8 
    (0.8)    (0.6)    (1.4)    (1.2)    (2.4)    (2.4)    (0.8)    (3.4)    (5.2)    (3.4) 
                                         
Sample size    3,363    3,455    1,341    1,223    411    418    883    203    92    117 
                                         
B.  Asian Countries    China    India    Japan    Korea    Philippines 




















Percent identified as Asian:                                         
   Asian on both sides of family    97.4    94.5    NA    92.3    99.0    97.1   100.0   100.0    98.5    96.6 
    (1.8)    (2.2)        (7.7)    (1.0)    (2.1)    (0.0)    (0.0)    (1.1)    (1.2) 
   Asian on one side of family only    34.5    49.5    12.0    32.7    18.2    37.0    18.4    44.3    22.6    43.6 
    (3.1)    (3.4)    (4.6)    (4.6)    (2.2)    (3.0)    (5.6)    (3.8)    (2.2)    (2.2) 
   All    50.3    64.9    12.0    39.2    38.1    49.4    29.8    53.8    42.8    60.9 
    (2.9)    (2.7)    (4.6)    (4.5)    (2.4)    (2.8)    (6.1)    (3.4)    (2.2)    (1.8) 
                                         
Sample size    306    322    50    120    409    330    57    212    502    724 
 
Source:  1994-2010 CPS data. 
Note:  Standard errors are shown in parentheses.  The samples include U.S.-born children ages 17 and below who live in intact families and have two U.S.-born 
parents but at least one grandparent born in the relevant source country.  For Indians, the sample for the years 1994-2002 contains no observations with Asian 
ethnicity on both sides of the family. 
 